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Case No. 20080120-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

David Daniel Quintana,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for distribution of a controlled substance
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance in
a drug-free zone, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUB
Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case to the jury where the
evidence was undisputed that defendant stored methamphetamine in his kitchen
freezer and where the evidence and its fair inferences, viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that he sold methamphetamine
to a confidential informant?

Standard of Review.

To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must

demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should have been obvious, and
that, absent the error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
State v. Dunn, 850 R2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count each of
distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in
a drug-free zone, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii), and possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a
drug-free zone, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i). R. 42-43. A jury convicted him as charged. R. 54. The court sentenced
defendant to concurrent prison terms of five years to life on the first degree felony
and one-to-fifteen years on the second degree felony, with credit for time served. R.
111-13. Defendant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. R. 115-17. Pursuant to rule
42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court poured the case
over to this Court. R. 123.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Controlled Buy

On January 27,2006, two officers of the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike
Force arranged with a confidential informant ["CI"] to purchase
methamphetamine from defendant. The informant, who had a criminal history
that included convictions for methamphetamine possession, conspiracy to
commit robbery, and theft, had worked with the officers for several months. R.
130:126,129,133. Officer Grogan, the case agent, acknowledged the CI's
criminal history, noting that "the criminal record is part of the package that you
accept" when working with a CI with connections to the drug trade. R. 131: 50.
Grogan further testified that the CI had previously "given good information on
other cases that led to arrests. He'd also done a good job on other cases
introducing undercover officers to other sources and [he] always followed
directions." Id. at 51.
In this case, the CI told the officers he could buy methamphetamine from
defendant. R. 130:133. Consequently, after searching the CI, providing him with
two marked $100 bills, wiring him, and setting up surveillance, the officers drove
the CI to the vicinity of defendant's home. R. 131:53-55. Officers were strategically
placed to observe defendant from the moment he left the officer's vehicle until he
3

entered defendant's home and from the moment he left the home until he was safely
back with an officer. R. 130:164-67,190-91; R. 131: 64-66.
The CI testified that he waited about ten minutes outside the home and then
was invited inside by defendant and led to a back room. R. 130:138-39. In this
room, the CI saw a surveillance camera, which was pointed towards the back yard.
Id. at 140. After arranging to buy an "eightball," or 3.5 grams of methamphetamine,
the CI and defendant discussed the purchase of larger quantities of
methamphetamine in the future. Id. at 141,143; R. 131:61. The two men exchanged
phone numbers. R. 130: 144. Defendant left the room and returned with a box. The
CI testified, "There was bags or a bag of methamphetamine in it. Weighed it out,
put it in a bag, and gave it to me after I had handed [defendant] the money." Id. at
144,146. The CI put the baggie of meth in his pocket and walked out of the house
and around the corner to an officer's car. Id. at 146. Once in the car, the CI turned
the baggie over to the officer. Id. at 147. Back at the starting location, officers
searched the CI and subsequently paid him $100 for successfully completing the
controlled buy. Id. at 128,147.
Officer Grogan testified that he began preparing a search warrant after the
controlled buy was complete. He stated, "The material's fresh on my mind. I know
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what just happened, I can write it down in a search warrant at that time and just
keep track of it as I go and build the case/7 R. 131: 90.
Officers Execute the Search Warrant

Just about two weeks later, on February 10,2006, Officer Grogan received
a phone call from detectives who were at defendant's home on a different matter.
R. 130:172; R. 131:90,91. Because those officers were already on the scene and
wanted to talk with defendant, and because defendant was present in the home
but not responding to the officers, Grogan decided to get his warrant signed and
executed. R. 131:90-92; 114. He did so, and the officers entered defendant's
home on a no-knock warrant. Id. at 92-93. Inside, they found defendant,
another man, and a woman. Id. at 93.
In the course of searching the home pursuant to the warrant, an agent
found a baggie of methamphetamine in the freezer compartment of the
refrigerator. R. 130:174,195. In the back room, Officer Grogan found
surveillance equipment, including a camera and monitor. R. 131: 95. The officer
testified that "it is indicative of individuals that use and sell narcotics to have
surveillance equipment. Especially in a home where there's not any property,
there's not a lot of furniture or expensive items." Id. at 96.
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Based on the methamphetamine that defendant sold to the CI and the
methamphetamine that the agent found in defendant's freezer, the State charged
defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled substance and
possession of a controlled substance. Both counts were enhanced because
defendant's home was located within a drug-free zone. R. 42-43.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For defendant to prevail on an unpreserved sufficiency claim raised as
plain error, he must first demonstrate that the evidence did not suffice to support
the conviction. He fails to do so.
First, defendant contends that the confidential informant was not credible
because he had a criminal record and was paid for his work by the narcotics task
force. Therefore, he asserts, the evidence was insufficient to support the
distribution charge. The jury, however, knew the CI's background and
nonetheless found his testimony credible. Moreover, three police officers
corroborated the circumstances surrounding the controlled buy. Defendant's
argument ultimately fails because credibility determinations are left to the jury,
which is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony. A reviewing court
will not reweigh the jury's assessments.
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Second, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of possession of a controlled substance. Where defendant conceded that
mefhamphetamine was found in his freezer and where no evidence suggested
that anyone else either lived in his house or had access to his freezer, the jury
could reasonably infer that the contents of the freezer belonged to him. No more
is necessary to defeat a claim of insufficiency of the evidence.
ARGUMENT
L
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN SUBMITTING
THE CASE TO THE JURY WHERE THE EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT SOLD
METHAMPHETAMINE TO A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT
AND WHERE IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT DEFENDANT
STORED METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS KITCHEN FREEZER
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by submitting the case to the jury
because the evidence was insufficient to prove either that defendant sold
mefhamphetamine to a confidential informant or that the mefhamphetamine found
in his freezer belonged to him. See Br. of Aplt. at 6.
At the outset, to reverse the trial court's ruling, defendant must marshal the
evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (explaining marshaling requirement).
Marshaling requires a defendant to gather and present, in a light most favorable to
the verdict, "every scrap of competent evidence... which supports the very findings
7

[he] resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App.
1991). He must "fully embrac[e] the [State's] position" without "simply rearguing
and recharacterizing" the evidence. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75,117,124 P.3d 235
(citations and quotations omitted). Failure to properly marshal the evidence suffices
to reject a sufficiency claim. See, e.g., Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1 17; State v. Hopkins, 1999
UT 98,116,989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991).
While defendant has made some attempt to marshal the evidence supporting
the second-degree-felony possession charge, he has wholly failed to marshal the
evidence related to the first-degree-felony distribution charge. See Br. of Aplt. at 1011. For this reason alone, the Court should decline to consider his challenge to the
distribution charge.
Moreover, because defendant did not preserve the sufficiency issue at trial by
filing a motion for a directed verdict, he must rely on a plain error argument on
appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,116,10 P.3d 346 (generally, in order to
preserve issue for appeal, defendant must raise sufficiency claim by proper motion).
"[T]o establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury/ 7 Id. at 117. Only after the defendant convincingly
8

makes an initial showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain
error to submit the case to the jury/' Id. at f l 8 .
Defendant's argument fails on both counts. First, defendant argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support the charge of distribution of a controlled
substance because the CI offered the "only evidence" to support the charge.
Defendant contends that the informant's testimony was not credible because he was
paid by the narcotics task force and had a criminal record. See Br. of Aplt. at 11.
Defendant recognizes that three police officers also offered evidence, but discounts
their testimony in its entirety because two of the officers provided inconsistent
statements about peripheral details—whether the CI had cigarettes or a wallet or
nothing at all with him at the time of the controlled buy. Id.
Defendant's argument fails because it relies on an appellate reassessment of
the witnesses' credibility. The law is well-settled that "determinations of witness
credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of
any witness's testimony." State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968,972 (Utah App. 1993) (citing
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,904-05 (Utah App. 1990).
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves
as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given particular evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court
9

may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1993)(citations omitted). In this case, the
jury knew that the informant had a criminal record and that the task force paid him
for arranging and completing the controlled buy.

The jury also knew that

informants typically have imsavory criminal histories and that this particular
informant had proven reliable on multiple past occasions. See R. 131:49-51. After
hearing the informant's testimony, the jury apparently chose to believe him. A
reviewing court will not revisit this credibility determination on appeal. State v.
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1117 (Utah App. 1995).
Furthermore, as to the discrepancy in the testimony of the three officers, the
law is equally well-settled that minor inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's
testimony will not warrant reversal based on insufficient evidence. State v. Baker,
963 P.2d 801,809 (Utah App. 1998). It was well within the prerogative of the jury to
believe both that one or more of the officers were mistaken about the personal items
defendant had on his person and that the officers accurately described the
circumstances surrounding the controlled buy.
Second, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
possession of a controlled substance, the charge arising from the execution of the
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search warrant in February of 2006. Curiously, however, he concedes that "[i]t is
undisputed that an illegal substance was found in the freezer at [defendant's
home." Br. of Aplt. at 10. Defendant points to no record evidence that anyone else
lived in the home or even had access to the freezer. The Utah Supreme Court has
determined that, especially where occupancy is non-exclusive, courts establish a
nexus between defendant and drugs by examining factors such as "incriminating
statements made by the accused," "incriminating behavior of the accused," the
"presence of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had control," and the
"presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place
over which accused has special control." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,319 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted). Here, no evidence suggested that defendant's occupancy of the
home was anything but exclusive.

In addition, defendant had surveillance

equipment in his home and had recently sold drugs to a CI. Together, these facts all
point to a clear nexus between defendant and the methamphetamine found in his
freezer.
Defendant argues that the State failed to establish his nexus to the drugs
because two other people happened to be in the home at the time the warrant was
executed. Br. of Aplt. at 10. As to these two individuals, however, the record
evidence supports only their presence in the front room, where they waited with
11

one officer while other officers executed the search warrant. R. 130: 174. Not a
shred of evidence suggests they were ever in the kitchen, much less that either of
them had access to the freezer or owned the drugs found in the freezer.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, a jury could fairly infer that the person
who lives in the home possesses whatever might be found in the freezer. See, e.g.,
Goffinet v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)(under theory of
constructive possession, knowledge of presence of contraband "may be inferred
from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the
contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances
pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband" (citation
omitted)); Posey v. State, 736 So.2d 656,658 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)(same); cf. People
v. Wilkie, 522 P.2d 727, 729 (Colo. 1974)(joint possession of apartment at least
partially under dominion and control of accused suffices to establish accused's
possession of drugs found in refrigerator).
In this case, no record evidence suggests that the other two people who
happened to be in the home when the officers executed the search warrant either
lived there or had access to the freezer. Thus, the inference that the drugs found in
the freezer belonged to defendant is not only a reasonable inference, or even the
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most reasonable inference; it is the only reasonable inference. No more is necessary
to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted November /3.2008.
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Utah Attorney General
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